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In recent years the challenges mounted by black opposition and 
résistance groupings to the South African apartheid state have 
repeatedly become the focus of national and international 
attention. There is something baffling about these occasions. Time 
and again - with Sharpeville as the culmination in 1960 of the 
Défiance Campaigns over the previous decade, again with the 
éruption of Soweto in 1976, and most recently with the 
widespread and sustained insurrections in the black townships 
during 1984-86 - both casual and seasoned observers have been 
led to expect the imminent and inévitable collapse of minority 
white rule and of the apartheid state. Yet somehow the inévitable 
and imminent collapse does not take place and the South African 
state manages to stretch the receding horizon of short term 
survival into the very long term indeed. Clearly the substance 
and strenght of black opposition and résistance relative to the 
power of the state have been overestimated in the past. But this 
could easily lead to a contrary misjudgement, to think that 
nothing has changed and that the current balance of forces is 
essentially the same as that of 1976 or 1960. 
In fact there have been major Substantive and structural 
changes in the context of the South African conflict over this 
time. This paper attempts to sketch in broad outline some of the 
main contextual changes which are essential to a proper 
assessment of the prospects for black opposition and résistance at 
the present time. It wil l not attempt to add in any way to the 
many important detailed studies of black political movements 
since the Second World War, e.g. Black Politics since 1945 by 
Tom Lodge, or to the literature on 1976 and the current South 
African crisis. Instead it will stand back and attempt to locate 
these more specific developments within a larger structural and 
dynamic context as this changed over the period from 1960 to 
the present. In this way it may then appear how unlike the 
74 
The Changing Context 
present situation is to that of 1976 and 1960 despite the 
superficial similarities. 
The impact of world pressure and the internationalisation of 
Southern African policies 
In the 25 years following World War II the consolidation of white 
minority rule and of the apartheid order meant that South Africa 
began to diverge sharply from internationally accepted public 
norms. The earlier tradition of segregation had not been 
fundamentally out of line with Western norms at the time, and 
South Africa could still participate in international forums abroad 
and pursue domestic policies without interference at home. But 
while the post-war world under the traumatic impact of the 
Holocaust in Europe, of decolonisation in Africa and Asia and of 
the civi l rights movement in the United States came to regard 
any public recognition of racial inequality as anathema, the 
National Party government af ter 1948 set about the statutory 
enactment of racial differentiations in every sphere of the 
economy, society and politics. At first though, international 
reaction remained confined to moral criticism and diplomatic 
protests and this did not interfere with the internal 
consolidation of the apartheid state. After the initial scare of 
Sharpeville, foreign capital flowed in again to ensure record 
levels of growth during the 1960s. From the mid-1970s this 
changed. The collapse of the Portugese colonies in Mozambique 
and Angola in 1974, and the end of Rhodesian UDI a few years 
later, removed the cordon sanitaire which had sheltered South 
Africa from guerilla insurgency and brought external pressures to 
our own borders. The Soweto rising of June 1976 and the spread 
of civi l unrest throughout the country during the following 
months focussed international attention on South Africa's internal 
policies and led to the adoption of a mandatory arms ban at the 
United Nations. More importantly, from the second half of the 
1970s new foreign investment in South Africa began to dry up, 
due both to the declining profitability of multinational companies 
operating here and to perceptions of increasing political risks. 
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Without this crucial input, earlier levels of economie growth 
could no longer be sustained. The open nature of the South 
African economy was further demonstrated by such events as the 
oil crisis following the fall of Iran, the severe balance of 
payments problems in the late 1970s, the impact of changes in 
the price of gold, the international debt crisis following the 
sharp changes in currency exchange rates in the mid-1980s 
eteetera. In turn, the upsurge of internal unrest in 1984-6 fuelled 
the international campaigns for economic sanctions and 
disinvestment and greatly facilitated the exiled A N C in gaining a 
growing measure of international récognition. 
At the same time Southern African politics became 
increasingly internationalised. The ongoing diplomatic dispute over 
South West Africa/Namibia continued to involve outside agents 
and forums as well (the United Nations, the Western Contact-
group, United States State Department initiatives, the E P G -
initiative eteetera). The efforts of SWAPO and the A N C to mount 
guérilla raids from external bases in neighbouring territories have 
brought South Africa into complex conflicts with these 
"Frontline" states. Following its military invasion of Angola 
during the civil war in 1975 South Africa has increasingly come 
to act as a kind of regional super power whose security 
objectives transcend national boundaries. In turn this has brought 
about the active involvement in the région of the international 
super powers (United States' "constructive engagement") and/or 
their proxies (the Cuban forces in Angola). 
In the decade following 1975 it has thus become increasingly 
clear that South Africa is not insulated against the trends and 
pressures of the Western world and of Africa. Moreover, it 
cannot afford to maintain apartheid in défiance of this outside 
world and at the same time hope to sustain the growth rate of 
more than five per cent, needed to provide enough jobs for its 
rapidly growing population. Apartheid has become a highly 
politicised issue internationally in a wide range of organisational 
contexts, while South Africa's own actions in the sub-continent 
have consistently undermined the traditional defence that outside 
interférence in its internal af fairs is unwarranted. 
76 
The Changing Context 
From the point of view of the internal opposition and 
résistance movements the results remain somewhat ambiguous. In 
gênerai the increase of international pressures and outside 
involvement have provided much needed support to various 
internal opposition groupings or desegregating objects, thus 
hastening the dismantling of apartheid structures. On the other 
hand it is exceedingly difficult to target large-scale outside 
interventions at all successfully, and international boycotts, 
sanctions and disinvestment campaigns may also have profound, 
unintended and counterproductive conséquences. Short of direct 
involvement by the super powers, which could lead to a fatal 
escalation of military conflict, it is difficult to see how external 
support can bring about an effective challenge to the continuing 
power of the South African State. 
Demographic changes and socio-economic relations 
Unt i l the middle of the twentieth Century white minority rule in 
South Africa was parallelled by a Virtual white monopoly of the 
Strategie positions in the economy, the administrative apparatus 
and the educational System. Land and capital was overwhelmingly 
in the hands of whites, who also supplied the skilled (and much 
of the semi-skilled) workers in the economy as well as the 
personnel for the middle and senior ranks of the State 
bureaucracies and the security apparatus. Substantial numbers of 
(Afrikaans-speaking) whites had been poor, with little éducation 
or skills, but this was redressed through Afrikaner-Nationalist 
control of the State. While the vast majority of Africans 
remained unskilled and semi- or illiterate, compulsory éducation 
for whites, the job colour bar in the labour market and protected 
employment opportunities in the expanding civil service provided 
many poor whites with the means for upward social mobility. 
As South Africa entered the second half of the twentieth 
Century the basic démographie ratio's began to change. Before 
1960 whites constituted 20 per cent of the total population; this 
has now decreased to less than 15 per cent and it is expected to 
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shrink further to a proportion approaching 10 per cent at the 
outset of the twentyfirst Century. It had been precisely these 
trends, and their inherent implications for white rule, which the 
policy of separate development attempted to undo by excluding 
blacks from political rights except in "separate states", by turning 
the growing tide of black urbanisation through rigorous influx 
control and migrant labour, and by the resettlement of millions 
of people from "black spots" and the white farms in the 
homelands. 
Ho wever, from the mid-1970s public policy makers began to 
realise that these démographie trends, coupled with the needs of 
the economy, required not the excorporation, but instead the 
socio-economic incorporation of substantial numbers of blacks. 
Since the proportionately declining number of whites could no 
longer supply the demand for semi-skilled and skilied labour these 
would now have to be drawn from other population groups. This 
was recognised by the Wiehahn-Riekert reforms of labour policy 
which granted significant labour and trade union rights to blacks. 
Already the composition of the skilled labour force is changing. 
Studies show that while whites still f i l l more than 90 per cent of 
all the senior administrative and management positions, the white 
proportion in medium-level manpower dropped substantially from 
82 per cent in 1965 to 65 per cent in 1981. Projections suggest 
that by the end of the twentieth century blacks wil l constitute 
an absolute majority of skilled manpower. 
Partly in anticipation of these developments black secondary 
and higher éducation began to expand rapidly from the early 
1970s. The enrollment figures in African secondary éducation 
increased sharply from a base of 122.000 in 1970 to 318.000 in 
1975 and upwards of 1 million in 1984, with the number of 
African matriculants going from less than 3.000 in 1970 to 9.000 
in 1975 and more than 86.000 in 1984. (Over the same period the 
number of university students increased from less than 5.000 to 
more than 36.000). With a continuation of present trends blacks 
wil l thus constitute absolute majorities in the number of 
matriculants and of the skilled labour force within the next 
decade. 
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The last decade has thus produced significant changes in the 
social composition and power of major population groups. Labour 
reforms have spawned a burgeoning black labour and trade union 
movement, though there is as yet little sign of any substantial 
"black middle class" (leaving aside the special case of the Asians). 
A t the same time the power and influence of the white working 
class has sharply declined, while increasingly new générations of 
professionals, technocrats, academies and entrepreneurs (who now 
constitute a significant proportion of Afrikaners as well) no 
longer feel the need for special protective policies on the part of 
the state. 
In some senses these changes have dramatically closed many 
of the educational, social and cultural gaps between the different 
population groups. At the same time they also intensif y the 
profound grievances focussed on the structures of exclusion and 
inequality. It is no accident that black students and high school 
pupils have taken the lead in the boycotts, protests and riots in 
the urban townships in 1976-7 and again in 1984-6, or that the 
black schools and universities have become such pervasive sites 
of turmoil and conflict. Moreover, there must be serious question 
marks regarding both the quality and the kind of secundary 
éducation provided to blacks within a segregated system and 
under these circumstances. It remains to be seen to what extent 
the economy wil l in fact be able to absorb them. The expansion 
of black secondary éducation took place in the context of an 
economy which could no longer sustain earlier levels of growth, 
leading to spiralling black unemployment. The dramatic increase 
in the number of African matriculants may thus in effect 
generate a fast growing group of highly politicized urban 
unemployed with little prospect of finding in the market place 
the kind of employment associated with their educational 
qualifications. Unless the state is prepared to change the 
character of the civil service and of the security forces by 
opening up their middle and eventually senior ranks to a rapidly 
increasing number of blacks they will provide the potential cadres 
for more militant and violent political movements, capable of 
disrupting social reform and political Settlements. 
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Changes in the relation of state and society 
The two décades before 1975 saw a significant expansion of the 
state in its relation to South African society through the massive 
growth of a number of important state bureaucracies. In 
particular the various departments and agencies administering 
black affairs grew into a virtual "state within a state", with 
comprehensive control over almost every aspect of Africans' lives: 
their movement, employment, housing, éducation etcétera. Towards 
the end of the 1960s the number of arrests of Africans under the 
pass laws and influx control régulations had gone up to nearly 
700.000 arrests per year (compared to an average of 130.000 
arrests per year in the 1930s). Similarly, the powerful 
bureaucracy of Community Development, implementing group 
áreas, actually moved a total of no less than 120.000 Coloured 
and Asian families from their homes. To combat internai and 
external threats to white rule the security forces, intelligence 
agencies and the military apparatus were greatly expanded in the 
post-Sharpeville period, backed up by drastic new security 
législation. Through the SABC, the Department of Information and 
censorship agencies, the state also gained increasing control 
over the media, while launching its own overt and covert 
propaganda campaigns. 
This growth of the state apparatus had a number of différent 
dimensions and conséquences: it greatly enhanced the ability of 
central government to structure social and economic relations and 
to maintain political control; it increasingly centralised political 
power and decision-making, thereby diminishing the significance 
of local and regional authorities; it provided stable and protected 
employment to significant numbers of whites, giving them a 
vested interest in the perpétuation of the apartheid structures 
they administered; and it increasingly led to internai conflicts 
and tensions between rival bureaucracies within the state 
apparatus itself. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s this growth of the state in 
relation to society came up against its limits in various ways. In 
a number of cases the state bureaucracies which had to 
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administer influx control, migrant labour and resettlement 
schemes met with intractable résistance from the communities 
involved, sometimes assisted by local organisations with the 
resources to provide legal counsel as well as national and 
international Publicity (Crossroads, etc.) . More generally these 
agencies proved increasingly ineffective in coping with the 
pervasive and overwhelming pressures of black urbanisation and 
the de facto émergence of vast peri-urban shack Settlements. By 
1984 the officiais directly responsible for influx control in the 
Western Cape, the area where the State had most adamantly 
persisted in the démolition of shacks and the prosecution and 
removal of people to the Ciskei and Transkei, admitted that 
these efforts had in practice proved a failure. The total number 
of pass law arrests decreased from 700.000 in 1969 to 160.000 in 
1984, and in 1985 the government announced that influx control 
would be replaced with a policy of orderly urbanisation. In the 
case of group areas the partial reversai of officiai efforts has 
been less momentous. Partly in response to the growing 
importance of the black consumer market, many of the 
requirements of statutory ségrégation could no longer be 
effectively enforced in central business districts, a de facto 
situation only belatedly and tardily recognised by officiai policy 
changes in the mid-1980s. Contrary to statutory group areas, 
considérable numbers of Asians and Coloureds also moved into 
apartment blocks in the inner city metropolitan areas of Durban, 
Cape Town and Johannesburg with officiais unwilling or unable to 
do much about this. In part due to the independent imperatives 
and initiatives of these bodies, the State also had to relax its 
earlier efforts to impose direct and wholesale racial exclusion on 
universities, cultural institutions and professional organisations. 
However, the basic pattern of residential and educational 
ségrégation had already been too well established for such 
developments to amount to more than minor exceptions to the 
previous state-imposed social structures. 
At another level the fitful and stagnant economy of the last 
décade brought it home that there are definite limits to the 
resources which the State could harness. The expansion of black 
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éducation and the concomitant needs for housing and welfare 
services coupled to the existing public expenditures on the 
apartheid bureaucracies, uneconomic decentralization policies, 
subsidies to white interest groups and escalating defence budgets, 
created a fiscal crisis for the state. Given the relatively small 
scale and law growth rates of the South African economy there 
were evident limits to further increases in public spending and 
thus to the growth of state bureaucracies. Accordingly, 
government began to adopt a more co-operative stance to the 
private sector, publicly affirmed with the historie rapprochement 
between the National Party leadership and organised business at 
the Carlton and Good Hope conferences, and neo-liberal "free 
marketeering" ideas gained some influence in public policy. In 
part due to the internal bureaucratie rivalries and conflicts which 
had come into the open with the "Information Scandal" in the 
late 1970s the new P.W. Botha-administration also set itself the 
goal of a comprehensive "rationalisation" of the mushrooming 
state bureaucracies. However, despite considérable organisational 
reshuffling and much talk of the concentration of power under 
the aegis of the State Security Council, it would not appear that 
the existing bureaucracies have been either much diminished or 
revitalised. Instead, the new tricameral parliament of 1984 has 
brought a renewed prolifération of "own af fairs" bureaucracies in 
its wake, while for political reasons the National Party 
government continues to buy off the middle and senior ranks of 
white civil servants with substantial salary increases, housing 
subsidies etcetera. 
The final testing ground for the power of the state lies in 
its ability to maintain public order. In this respect the last 
decade saw repeated challenges to state institutions exposing 
serious limitations to the capabilities of political mechanisms and 
of the security forces. In 1976-77 boycotts and protest 
démonstrations by black high school and university students 
against local educational authorities led to sustained civi l unrest 
in urban black townships throughout the country. The public 
exposure of the brutal methods adopted by local security forces 
in the course of the Biko Inquest provided a focus for national 
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and international pressure. On his accession to power P.W. Botha, 
with his base in the rival military bureaucracy, responded with 
the appointment of the Rabie Commission giving it a 
comprehensive brief regarding security législation and affairs. In 
this context such an influential figure in government circles as 
adv. D.P. de Villiers called for the restoration of the rule of law. 
In the event, however, the Rabie Commission failed to take on 
this challenge and local security forces were left with virtually 
unchecked powers as before. Meanwhile, the state proceeded with 
its attempts to co-opt collaborative black elites into new 
structures of local authority. In effect this amounted to a kind of 
indirect rule, interposing councillors elected with minimal 
electoral turnouts and with few powers or resources at their 
disposai to administer unpopulär rent increases etcétera. In the 
renewed unrest of 1984-86, now in many rural townships as well, 
these community councillors and other agents of the state, such 
as black policemen and informers, became the main targets of 
intimidation and of outright violence. Almost across the board the 
new black local authorities broke down. More generally, the state 
proved unable to maintain public order in the townships except 
by means of severely coercive measures. The S A D F had to be 
called in for support, and a state of emergency declared in a 
number of magisterial districts, followed by the second (national) 
state of emergency since June 1986. 
Outside the townships white rule has not yet been seriously 
challenged at all, and the present government's control of the 
state is no doubt secure for the foreseeable future. However, in 
its present form the state lacks the power to restructure society 
at large. In particular, the state suffers from a serious crisis of 
legitimacy as far as urban (and many rural) black communities 
are concerned, a condition further exacerbated by the of ten 
brutally coercive measures adopted by the security forces in the 
name of law and order. In present circumstances it is difficult to 
see how this legitimacy crisis can be resolved without allowing 
blacks to particípate in open political processes at local and 
national levéis. The basic contradiction between the increasing 
socio-economic incorporation of especially urban blacks and their 
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political excorporation cannot be indefinitely contained by 
coercive means only. 
Ideological changes and restructuring 
The 1960s saw the culmination of Afrikaner nationalism as a 
movement of exclusive ethnic mobilisation coupled with a rigid 
and systematic racial ideology centered on racial separation in all 
spheres of social life and the denial of black rights except within 
the structures of "separate states". Since the National Party had 
captured political power and was in effective control of the 
state, this public ideology had a prominent role in the 
consolidation of the apartheid order. 
From the early 1970s a steady and pervasive process of 
ideological restructuring began to take place. Afrikaner 
nationalism became somewhat more inclusive, prepared to tolerate 
a considerable diversity of views within its own ranks and to co-
opt former opponents as junior partners. Racial ideology and 
policy was progressively transformed into a more pragmatic and 
flexible approach capable of accommodating a variety of 
desegregatory measures especially in economic and some social 
contexts. This process of restructuring racial ideology was 
mediated by the growing prevalence of a technocratic ethos in 
public decisionmaking. Instead of remaining the exclusive domain 
of the National Party caucus and the Broederbond, public 
commissions of inquiry, statutory bodies like the President's 
Council and research establishments such as the HSRC were 
increasingly involved in the process of public policymaking. 
Appeals to rationality with a view to a pragmatic consensus took 
the place of Verwoerdian ideological rigour. By such means it 
proved possible to obfuscate specific ideological shibboleths of 
the past and to extend the range of options on the agenda of 
public policymaking sufficiently to allow significant changes in 
official policy positions without too much damage to the National 
Party's traditional political constituency. In effect the National 
Party government could thus move in less than a decade from the 
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policy objective of a (white) South Africa "with no black 
Citizens" to the public acceptance of blacks as in principle 
Citizens of a common country. As yet there does not, however, 
appear to be any definite form of ideological support among 
whites for the actual implementation of these principles. While 
the influence of the earlier nationalist and racial idéologies has 
waned, both as motivating factors for and as constraints on 
public policy-making, no definite "reformist" ideology has taken 
their places. With the coercive clampdown of the second state of 
emergency in the wake of the widespread insurrections of 1984-6, 
the "reformist" public stance of the P.W. Botha government for 
the time being had to give way to security considérations. 
The significance of ideological changes in black politics 
remains unclear. Since the mid-70s the coherent thrust of the 
Black Consciousness Movement among students and youths appears 
to have been diffused and there has been a revival of 
"Charterist" orientations. In turn this has been challenged by a 
more pronounced socialist tendency in former Black Consciousness 
circles as well as by "Workerists" based on the trade union 
movement. In gênerai it would appear that the expériences of 
1976-7, 1979-80, and 1984-6 have politicised and radicalised urban 
blacks generally. But this has not yet been translated into 
definite and coherent ideological positions (despite much loose 
talk of marxist or socialist alternatives). This could be important 
for the prospects of future political change in different ways. On 
the one hand the ideological fluidity of black political thought 
and the lack of rigid and fixed positions provide considérable 
scope for alternative political stratégies and/or Settlements. On 
the other hand the ideological unstructured radicalisation of many 
blacks constitutes a volatile and unpredictable political climate in 
which orderly political processes, and the politics of negotiation 
in particular, could prove very difficult. In the aftermath of the 
insurrectionary wave of 1984-6, which failed to mount an 
effective challenge to the power of the South African state, 
opposition and résistance groupings generally have been forced 
to strategie re-alignments, the outcome of which is still unclear. 
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Constitutional and legal changes 
The statutory framework of the apartheid state, from race 
classification and group areas to segregated education and 
separate amenities, etcetera, had been virtually completed by the 
early 1970s. In the decade since 1975 this grand design of 
separate development was carried further by the granting of 
constitutional "independence" to Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei 
and Venda as well as additional powers of selfgovernment to 
other homelands. By and large these rural and underdeveloped 
regions were thus removed even further from the mainstream of 
South African politics, significantly adding to the fragmentation 
of black politics (though in the important case of KwaZulu this 
"independence option" was resisted with some success and led to 
the emergence of Inkatha as a black grouping with a significantly 
different base and strategy). 
In other respects the decade saw the beginning of a possible 
contrary trend. The demise of the Coloured Persons 
Representative Council eventually led to the introduction of the 
new tricameral parliament in 1984 restoring a form of 
parliamentary franchise to Coloureds and bringing Coloured and 
Asian representatives into parliament for the first time. Though 
of some symbolic significance in so far as it ostensibly reversed 
the trend away from a non-racial parliamentary franchise, which 
had already started in the nineteenth century, the new 
parliamentary structures were carefully designed to prevent 
effective alliances or coalitions across racial boundaries and to 
retain control in the hands of the majority party in the (white) 
House of Assembly. Despite much talk of moving away from the 
"Westminster model", as recommended by the Theron Commission 
in 1976, the introduction of an executive presidency did not 
provide it with any direct and independent electoral base. The 
opportunity to move towards a constitutional separation of powers 
with concommitant checks and balances on federalist lines was 
thus passed by. In so far as the new tricameral parliament is 
emphatically premissed on race classification and group areas it 
has built racial categories into the constitutional structure itself 
86 
The Changing Context 
while the central role of the "own affairs" and "general affairs" 
differentiation in both legislative and executive-administrative 
processes amounts to an entrenchment and elaboration of 
apartheid structures. These constitutional changes have thus 
actually increased the obstacles in the way of fundamental 
change away from the apartheid state. At the same time the 
explicit exclusion of the black majority from the tricameral 
parliament together with the introduction of the 4:2:1 ratio in 
the representation of white, coloured and Asian groups have 
added considerably to the political and constitutional difficulties 
of the political incorporation of Africans. This was dramatically 
shown by the rejection and failure of the new local government 
structures for blacks in 1984 and 1985. Though the National Party 
government had by 1985 come to accept publicly the need for 
black participation and representation at all levels of politics as 
citizens of a common country, it is very difficult to see how it 
would envisage this except on the basis of the homelands and 
statutorily defined ethnic and racial groups - that is, on the very 
basis of imposed ethnicity which has become wholly unacceptable 
to the majority of politicised urban blacks. The proposed National 
Statutory Council, as a transitional forum and mechanism for 
involving representatives of the black majority in some form of 
consultative or negotiation process, has remained a vague idea 
which has failed to secure the support even of Buthelezi and 
Inkatha. 
Changes in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political 
relations 
By the early 1970s the National Party had established an 
overwhelming predominance as an organised political movement in 
national politics. Within white parliamentary politics the United 
Party had effectively disintegrated as a potentially alternative 
government without leaving any credible successor for this role. 
The National Party, as the political instrument of Afrikaner 
nationalism, consistently drew 85% - 90% of Afrikaner votes, 
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which constituted an absolute majority among the electorale. The 
banning of the A N C and P A C followed by the massive security 
clampdowns during the 1960s had effectively blunted the 
challenge of the organised black political and résistance 
movements. A t that time there was no organised black labour 
movement of any conséquence, and organised business had little 
direct impact on public policy. The main extraparliamentary 
opposition forces centered on student movements such as N U S A S 
and church bodies such as the Christian Institute which operated 
from limited and fragile bases and were no match for a National 
Party government able to harness the considérable resources of 
the state and its security apparatus. 
In the course of the last decade this imbalance of forces has 
changed in substantial ways. The National Party itself became a 
more diversified and less cohesive political organisation, with 
serious internai tensions between rival factions. This eventually 
led to the split of the Treurnicht group in 1982 and the 
subséquent birth of the Conservative Party, with National Party 
support among Afrikaner voters in the early 1980s sometimes 
dropping to less than 60% and to well below 50% among all 
whites. This has been confirmed by the 1987 élection, with the 
Conservative Party emerging as the official opposition and the 
National Party increasingly dépendent on non-Afrikaner support. 
The 1970s also saw the résurgence of internal black political 
militancy led by the Black Consciousness Movement which even 
af ter its banning in 1977 was sustained and diffused in a wide 
variety of Community organisations. The Durban strikes of 1973-4 
presaged the rapid growth of the black trade union movement 
from the late 1970s which was Consolidated by the formation in 
1985 of COSA T U as a powerful fédération of trade unions 
representing an organised black labour force already numbering 
many hundreds of thousands. Meanwhile, Chief Buthelezi had 
Consolidated his initially limited political base by building up 
Inkatha into a political organisation claiming a membership of 
upwards of a million. The early 1980s further saw a résurgence in 
the popularity of the exiled A N C with Mandela becoming a major 
symbolic leadership figure, while the U D F was launched as a 
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populär front in protest against the introduction of the new 
tricameral parliament. Organised business (especially through the 
Urban Foundation) began to pursue more cohérent and specified 
political initiatives and to articulate more definite public 
positions in such documents as the Lombard/Du Pisani Assocom 
mémorandum and the FCI Charter in 1985. This higher political 
profile and preparedness to engage in independent political 
initiatives even extended to an exploratory mission to the A N C 
leadership in Lusaka, also in 1985. 
By the mid-80s there was thus a much wider range of 
organised political forces in the parliamentary and 
extraparliamentary arenas with the potential for possible new 
alliances that could eut across traditional cleavages. Some actors 
in the extraparliamentary movement have begun to show an 
interest in devising a formula for participation in local or 
national électoral processes, and this has been echoed by efforts 
like that of Wynand Malan and the N D M to establish contracts 
across the political no man's land. Ideally, thèse could be the 
participants in a new politics of negotiation which might résolve 
the présent crisis of legitimacy. In the course of 1985-6 actual 
instances of such negotiations at a local level did indeed take 
place. However, this has been ruled out by the State of 
emergency with its continuing severe restrictions on open 
political processes for blacks, the officiai refusai to unban the 
A N C , détentions of many political leaders, security actions 
against the U D F eteetera. Though the extraparliamentary 
opposition, unlike in the 1960s, has been able to survive 
politically, their activities and effectiveness are severely curtailed 
and it remains an open question what the political alignment of 
the black communities would be i f and when such restrictions are 
relaxed. In the mean time the political rôle of the trade unions 
and organised business also remains distorted in significant ways. 
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Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the second state of emergency since 1986 it 
is now clear that those who had anticipated the imminent 
collapse of the South African state in 1985-6 had once again 
misjudged the power of that state. However, the current situation 
is by no means the same as that which followed Sharpeville in 
the 1960s. If Black 
political movements remain organisationally constrained and 
ideologically fluid to an extent which make it impossible to 
predict developments with any certainty, it is nevertheless clear 
that in the present configuration of forces their impact on the 
emerging new South Africa will be both substantial and growing. 
Suggestions for further reading 
The literature on modern South Africa is vast. This list is merely 
a preliminary suggestion to help in following up the ideas in 
Prof. Du Toit's paper: 
Brewer, John, After Soweto: an unfinished Journey, (Oxford 1986). 
Cobbett W. and R. Cohen (eds), Popular Struggles in South 
Africa, (London 1988). 
Davis, Stephen, Apartheid's Rebels: inside South Africa's hidden 
War, (New Haven and London 1987). 
Frankel, Philip, Noam Pines and Mark Swilling (eds), State 
Resistance and Change in South Africa, (London 1988). 
Friedman, Stephen, Building Tomorrow Today: A History of Mass 
F O S A T U Unions, (Johannesburg 1986). 
Grundy, Kenneth, The Militarization of South African Politics, 
(Oxford 1986). 
Lodge, Tom, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, (London 
1983). 
Lonsdale, John, (ed.) South Africa in Question, (London 1988). 
Stadler, A l f , The Political Economy of Modern South Africa, 
(London 1987). 
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Wölpe, Harold, Race, Class and the Apartheid State, (UNESCO 
1988). 
In addition, the South African Review, an annual publication of 
the South African Research Service, Vols I - IV (1984 - 8), 
contains a wealth of important and informative articles. 
The list was compiled by Dr Robert Ross. 
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